A simplified model for social welfare analysis : an application to Spain, 1973-74 to 1980-81 by Ruiz-Castillo, Javier
A SIMPLIFIED MODEL FOR 
SOCIAL WELFARE ANALYSIS. 
AN APPLICATION TO SPAIN, 
1973-74 TO 1980-81 
J avier Ruiz-Castillo 
96-04 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Cf) 
~ 
w 
0... 
« 
0... 
W or king Paper 96-04 
Economics Series 04 
January 1996 
Departamento de Economia 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Cal1e Madrid, 126 
28903 Getafe (Spain) 
Fax (341) 624-9875 
"A SIMPLIFIED MODEL FOR SOCIAL WELFARE ANALYSIS. AN APPLICATION TO 
SPAIN, 1973-74 TO 1980-81" 
Javier Ruiz.-Castillo 1 
Abstract _______________________________ _ 
Most of the literature on income distribution has been concentrated on inequality. In this paper 
we introduce also efficiency considerations to analize social welfare according to the established 
theory in Welfare Economics. We propose a simple but useful specification which combines three 
features: (i) a procedure to make welfare comparisons across households with different needs; (ii) 
the use of household specific statistical price indices to make intertemporal comparisons in real 
terms, and (iii) the selection of measurement instruments on the grounds of their properties for 
applied work, including the important additive separability property. The methodology is applied 
to the study of the role of prices and demographic effects in the evolution of the standard of living 
in Spain from 1973-74 to 1980-81. 
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INTRODucnON 
Most welfare analysis implicitly assume that social or aggregate welfare 
can be expressed in terms of only two statistics of the income distribution: the 
mean, and a measure of inequality. As Dutta and Esteban (1991) have shown, to 
achieve these objectives we need to specify the type of mean-invariance property 
we want our inequality indices to satisfy. This is politically important, since we 
know from the early discussion in Kolm (1976) that the choice of a mean-
invariance class of inequality measures is not merely a technical matter, but a 
value laden question1. In this paper, we will consider only the two polar cases: a 
relative inequality concept, according to which a proportional change in all 
incomes leaves the level of inequality unchanged; and an absolute inequality 
concept, according to which inequality remains constant only if all individuals 
experience the same absolute income change. 
Of course, a larger mean and a reduction in inequality are always to be 
prefered, but what are we to make of situations in which the two magnitudes 
move in the same direction? To be able to decompose welfare changes into 
changes in the mean and changes in either relative or absolute inequality, we 
need complete social evaluation functions (SEFs for short) capable of ordering all 
conceivable income distributions. Such indicators specify the trade off between 
efficiency and distributional considerations: a multiplicative trade off in the 
relative case, and an additive trade off in the absolute case. 
Finally, suppose that we have two islands where income is equally 
distributed but whose means are different If they now form a single entity, there 
will be no within-island inequality but there would be inequality between them. 
In income inequality theory we search for additively separable measures capable 
to express this intuition. In our context, for any partition we are interested in 
expressing social welfare for the population as the sum of two terms: a weighted 
average of welfare within the subgroups, with weights equal to demographic 
shares, minus a term which penalizes the inequality between subgroups. 
So far we have implicitly assumed that all individuals are identical. 
However, from a practical as well as a normative point of view, the first 
difficulty one encounters in income distribution theory is that persons come 
grouped in households of different characteristics and, therefore, different needs. 
Consequently, their incomes are not directly comparable. To advance the 
analysis we must select a population partition acording to some ethically 
2 
relevant characteristics. Since all households belonging to a given subgroup are 
assumed to have the same needs, it is always important to investigate separately 
each of the subgroups in the basic partition. However, social evaluation within 
subgroups need not yield unanimous results. In any case, it is always convenient 
to extract conclusions for the population as a whole. The problem, of course, is 
that in order to pool all households into a unique distribution, we need a 
procedure to compare non-income needs across subgroups. 
If we allow households to have different preferences, we would be 
forced to establish a "welfare correspondence" in the sense of Pollak (1991), 
determining which indifference curve on one's household's map yields the same 
welfare level as a particular curve on each other's map. Lacking a theory for that 
purpose, we must restrict ourselves to what Pollak calls "situational 
comparisons". Since Pollak and Wales (1979) these are made in terms of a 
fundamental unconditional utility function, common to all households, defined 
on commodities and ethically relevant household characteristics. Then, following 
Muellbauer (1974) and standard practice since that date, we can adjust incomes 
for price change and non-income needs, taking as reference a vector of base 
prices and a household type. 
In general, inequality within each subgroup depends on the choice of the 
reference type, say an adult or a couple. The reason is that identical 
characteristics might be enjoyed differently depending on the income level. For 
instance, identical households might experience different economies of scale in 
consumption depending on their income level. To avoid this, theoretical and 
econometric models make equivalence scales independent of the utility level. 
This simplification requires certain restrictions on unconditional preferences, but 
allows equivalence scales to depend both on ethically relevant characteristics and 
prices2. 
Attempts to infer from observed behavior household welfare 
comparisons and price effects along these lines, are expensive econometric 
exercises plagued with well known difficulties. Thus, for example, in their 
review of such difficulties, Coulter et al (l992a) conclude that "there is no Single 
'correct' equivalence scale for adjusting incomes -a range of scale relativities is 
both justifiable and inevitable". 
In this paper, we choose a less expensive strategy in two steps. On the 
one hand, following Coulter et al (1992a, 1992b) and Jenkins and Cowell (1994), 
we use parametric equivalence scales which depend only on demographic 
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variables. In particular, we study the robustness of our results to parameter 
changes which represent different views about the importance of economies of 
scale and/or the weight we should give children relative to adults. Naturally, 
the price independence is achieved at the cost of further restrictions on 
preferences. 
On the other hand, for the adjustment of money incomes to price change 
we use household specific statistical price indices. This allows us to study two 
issues. In the first place, we measure the distributional impact of changes in 
relative prices, and compare our results with those obtained under the usual 
assumption of a single inflation rate common to all households. In the second 
place, contrary to standard practice, we confront also the classical index number 
problem by expressing money incomes at the prices of the two situations under 
comparison. However, our results must be interpreted taking into account that 
our statistical price indices do not reflect household behavioral changes in 
response to price and income effects. Thewrefore, our indices provide only an 
upper (lower) bound to the true cost-of-living constructions of the Laspeyres 
(Paasche) type. 
Notice that there are several reasons for requiring additive separability 
from SEFs. We have mentioned already that we ought to evaluate separately 
each ethically homogeneous subgroup of the basic partition. Consequently, we 
want to understand how the evaluation for the population is built up from the 
evaluation for the subgroups. That the weights in the within-group term are 
demographic shares is decisive to explain the differences which obtain when the 
household or the person is taken as the unit of analysis. Moreover, as pointed out 
in Coulter et al (1992a), because any procedure for taking non-income needs into 
account is open to objections, we want to isolate as much as possible in the 
between-group inequality term the impact of changing equivalence scales 
parameter values3. 
As reviewed in Ruiz-Castillo (1995a), (i) the requirements for expressing 
welfare as a function of the mean and an index of relative or absolute inequality, 
(ii) the specification of a multiplicative or an absolute trade off between these 
two magnitudes, plus (iii) the additive separability property, lead to specific 
functional forms for SEFs: in the relative case, to a single member of the 
generalized entropy family and, in the absolute case, to the Kolm-Pollak family 
indexed by a parameter representing degrees of aversion to inequality. 
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These measurement tools are applied to Spanish data from two large 
household budget samples, of about 24.000 observations each: the Encuestas de 
Presupuestos Familiares (EPF for short), collected in 1973-74 and 1980-81 by the 
Spanish Instituto Nadonal de Estadistica (INE for short) with the main purpose of 
estimating the base weights of the official system of Consumer Price Indices. 
Like Slesnick (1991, 1993), we propose to identify a household standard of living 
with current commodity consumption. In our case, this will be better 
approximated by a measure of total expenditures, net of acquisitions of certain 
durables, rather than total income. 
During this period, right after the first oil crisis and in the middle of a 
radical political change in Spain, according to National Accounts data GNP grew 
at an average annual rate of about 2.3 percent at constant prices of 1986, while 
according to the Consumer Price Index there was a 322 percent inflation rate. In 
this context, our main empirical conclusions are the following: 
i) In Ruiz-Castillo (1995b) we found an improvement in relative 
inequality in real terms larger than in money terms, reflecting a pro-poor effect 
of this period's change in relative prices. Here we confirm this finding for our 
measure of absolute inequality. In both cases, such improvements are reasonably 
robust to the choice of base prices. However, while mean household expenditure 
increased by about 2 percent at prices of the Winter of 1981, denoted by P2' it 
decreased at least 3.5 percent at an average of 1973 and 1974 prices, denoted by 
PI' Thus, at P2 we estimate a welfare improvement of about 8 percent in the 
relative case, or 3.5-10.0 percent in the absolute case, but at PI we estimate a 
negligible improvement in relative welfare, at most equal to 1.5 percent, or a 
change in absolute welfare ranging from minus 3.5 to plus 2 percent. 
ii) When we apply the same inflation rate to all households in situation 
1, estimates of welfare change are similar to those registered at P2 with 
household specific price indices. However, since the only inequality 
improvement that can now be captured is the improvement in money terms, 
most of the real welfare improvement is wrongly attributed to an increase in the 
mean. 
iii) Both in the relative and the absolute case, cross-section estimates 
follow a non-linear pattern as a function of the parameter representing the 
weight to be given to household size. When economies of scale are small, the 
smaller the weight given to a child relative to an adult, the smaller the inequality 
in both cross-sections. However, inequality or welfare intertemporal 
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comparisons vary little with such parametrizations. In the absolute case, the 
greater the aversion to inequality the smaller the improvement in real welfare. 
iv) There are considerable variations among subgroups in the partition 
by household size. For instance, in the relative case at P2' small households end 
up with welfare increases greater than 15 percent, 3 to 7 person households with 
increases about 4-5 percent, and large households with welfare losses close to 10 
percent Given the fact that larger households do worse than smaller ones, 
welfare changes suffer a downward shift when adjusted household expenditure 
is weighted by household size. 
The rest of the paper is organized in three sections. The first section 
presents the measurement framework, including (i) the single parameter model 
of inter-household welfare comparisons, (ii) SEFs for the relative and the 
absolute case, (iii) our operative definition of a household standard of living, 
and .(iv) the nature of our approximation to social welfare change as a 
consequence of our method for the repricing of the scale variable. The second 
section, together with an statistical Appendix, is devoted to the empirical results. 
We first study the role of prices in welfare evaluation for each homogeneous 
subgroup within the partition by household size. Then we analize welfare 
change for the population as a whole, as well as the robustness of our results to 
(i) the different schemes to make interhousehold welfare comparisons and (ii) 
the unit of analysis. The final section offers some concluding comments. 
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I. THE MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK 
1.1. Interhousehold welfare comparisons 
Suppose we have a population of h = l, ... ,H households which can 
differ in a single dimensional variable -say, income- representing its standard 
of living, xh, and / or a vector of household characteristics. In this section, 
households of the same size are assumed to have the same needs and, 
therefore, their incomes will be directly comparable. Larger households have 
greater needs, but also greater opportunities to achieve economies of scale in 
consumption. Denote household size by sh and, for each household h, define 
adjusted income in the relative case by 
When e = 0, adjusted income coincides with unadjusted household income, 
while if e = I, it equals per capita household income. In the absolute case, we 
have 
where the parameter A can be interpreted as the cost of an adult. Of course, 
the greater is e or 'A, the smaller are the economies of scale within the 
household. 
Assume that there are m = l, ... ,M household sizes, and let xm be the 
vector of original incomes for households of size m. Notice that, if 1(.) is any 
index of relative inequality, then for each m we have 
Similarly, if A(.) is any index of absolute inequality, then for each m we have 
Thus, in both cases, within each ethically homogeneous subgroup, the 
inequality of adjusted income is equal to the inequality of original income, 
independently of individual incomes, prices and the choice of the reference 
group. 
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1.2. Admissible Social Evaluation Functions 
A SEF is a real valued function W defined in the space RH of adjusted 
incomes, with the interpretation that for each income distribution y = 
(yl, ... ,yH), W(y) provides the "social" or, simply, the aggregate welfare from a 
normative point of view. As indicated in the Introduction, the requirements 
for expressing welfare as a function of the mean and an index of relative or 
absolute inequality, the specification of a multiplicative or an absolute trade 
off between these two magnitudes, plus an additive separability property, lead 
- to specific functional forms for SEFs. 
Let us denote by ~ the function giving the mean of a distribution, and 
let ~ * be the distribution in which each household is assigned the mean 
income of the subgroup to which it belongs, ~(yrn), in the partition by 
household size. Let IT(.) be the first index of relative inequality originally 
suggested by Theil: 
Consider SEFs which can be expressed as the product of the mean and a term 
equal to one minus a relative inequality index. The only SEF among them 
with the property of additive decomposability with demographic weights, is 
the following: 
where H rn is the number of households of size rn, so that Lrn H rn = H. Thus, 
social welfare is seen to be a weighted average of the welfare within each 
subgroup, minus the between-group inequality weighted by the population 
mean. 
In the absolute case, analogous requirements lead to the Kolm-Pollak 
family of SEFs: 
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where y is interpreted as an aversion to inequality parameter: as y increases, 
social indifference curves show increasing curvature until, in the limit, only 
the poorest household income matters. The absolute inequality index 
associated with W y is 
Ajy) = [1 /y] In [(1 /H)~ e y (Il(Y) - yh)]. 
Let us denote by ~ * the distribution in which each household is assigned the 
equally distributed equivalent income of the subgroup to which it belongs, 
~(ym). Then 
* AfY) = Lm [Hm / H]Ay(~) + Af~ ), 
so that 
WfY) = Il(Y) - Ay(Y) = Lm [Hm /H]Wfym ) - A'i~*)' 
Thus, social welfare is equal to the mean minus the Kolm-Pollak absolute 
inequality index. On the other hand, social welfare is a weighted average of 
the welfare within each subgroup, minus the inequality between the 
subgroups. 
Taking into account our definitions of adjusted income, in the 
relative case we have 
and in the absolute case 
The upper bound for A, as well as the values for the aversion to inequality 
parameter ,,(, must be jointly selected taking into account that absolute 
inequality measures are not independent of the measurement unit. 
In Welfare Economics we are mostly interested in personal welfare, 
rather than on household welfare. Following standard practice, we can extend 
the SEF domain to distributions in which each household adjusted income is 
weighted by household size or, in other words, in which each person is 
assigned the adjusted income of the household to which she belongs. The 
above formulas for W T and W"( can be easily transformed for this case: 
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demographic shares, HID /H, as well as expressions Jl *(0) and ~*(A.), must be 
replaced by their counterparts in the distributions of persons. 
I. 3. The measurement of a household standard of living 
We agree with Slesnick (1991, 1993) that, ideally, we should identify 
the standard of living with commodity consumption. Lacking information 
on leisure and public goods consumption, our starting point must be 
household consumption of private goods and services. 
Given the nature of our data, we have several reasons for choosing 
household total expenditure rather than household total income to 
approximate household private consumption. i) There is a general 
presumption that current expenditure reflects permanent income, while 
current income includes more volatile transitory components. ii) The EPF's 
include information on income perceived by a maximum of four household 
members. However, they are designed to measure household expenditure 
with the purpose of estimating the Consumer Price Index weighting system. 
iii) Several groups might be inclined to underreport income. For instance, 
those working in the underground economy, the self-emplyed, professionals 
of all sorts, or agricultural workers. But none of them need be particularly 
prone to missreport their expenditures. iv) More than 60 percent of 
households spend more than they accrue as income4, and there is evidence 
showing less total income inequality than total expenditure inequalityS, 
contrary to all expectations. In our opinion, these facts need some explanation 
before income data can be comfortably used. 
In our surveys, we have a rather wide concept of total expenditure, 
including household transfers, as well as a number of imputations for self-
consumption and wages in kind, subsidized meals at work, and a market 
rental value, estimated by the owner, for owner-occupied housing. However, 
our experience with the 1980-81 EPF indicates6 that discontinuous household 
expenditures on some durables, whose occurrence may distort heavily the 
total, are best considered investment rather than consumption. These include 
current acquisitions of cars, motorcycles and other means of private 
transportation, as well as house repairs financed by either tenants or owner-
occupiers. Thus, our estimate of household current consumption will be total 
household expenditures, net of these investment items. 
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I. 4. The measurement of welfare change at constant prices 
We want to compare two popu1ations confronting different price 
1 H 
vectors in situations t = I, 2. Let Y = (Yt'''''y ) be the vector of household 
t t 
adjusted expenditures in situation t. Take the case t = I, and let y~2 be 
household h's adjusted expenditure in situation 1 expressed at prices of 
situation 2. Then, ideally we would compute y~2 = y~ L(P2' PI; u~), where \ 
L(P2' PI; ~h) is a true cost-of-living index of the Laspeyres type and u~ is the 
utility level achieved by household h in situation 1. When t = 2, to express y~ 
at prices of situation I, we would use the expression y~l = y~ /P(P2' PI; ~), 
where P(P2' PI; u~) is a true cost-of-living index of the Paasche type with an 
I . . f h ana ogous mterpretatIOn or ~ . 
To evaluate the social welfare change in real terms, we "'{ould 
compare y.., with y ..,= (Y!2/'''/Y~)' and y.., = (Y;l""/Y~) with Y . In the relative 
_ L _1 - 1 
case, we do this at prices P2' for example, by means of the expression 
~ W T2 = ~)l2 ~ET2' 
where 
Notice that there are no a priori reasons for ~)l2 or ~ET2 to be greater or 
smaller than ~)lI or ~ET1' respectively. Hence, nothing can be said about the 
relationship between ~WT2 and ~WT1' In the absolute case, the joint impact 
on welfare of changes in absolute inequality and changes in the mean at 
prices P2' for example, are evaluated relative to the welfare in situation 1. 
Thus, in the expression 
we have 
and 
11.5. The nature of our approximation 
1 1 
Our data comes from two budget surveys collected from July 1973 to 
June 1974, and from April 1980 to March 1981. They consist of 24.151 and 
23.971 observations, respectively, for a population of approximately 10 
million household occupying residential housing. In the empirical 
application we choose P2 = Winter of 1981 and Pt = (1/2) P73 + (1/2) P74. Let 
h 
w be the 57-dimensional vector of total expenditure commodity shares by 
t 
household h in the survey year t. For each h in 1973-74, we approximate the 
index L(p , Pt; ~h) by its upper bound L(p , Pt; w~); while for each h in 1980-
2 2,
81, we approximate the index P(P2' Pt; ~) by its lower bound P(P2' Pt; w~). 
. h h h h 
Therefore, our constructIOns Yt L(P2' Pt; w t) . and y 2 /P(P2' Pt; w2 ) 
overestimate the true ones, y~2 and y~l' for all h. Hence, at prices P2 (PI) our 
estimates for the real change in the mean, .1.Jl2 (.1.Jlt) provide a lower (upper) 
bound for their true value. On the other hand, if the substitution bias is 
greater for the rich, as can be expected, and the change in relative prices from 
Pt to P2 is less damaging to the poor than to the rich, as we know to be the 
case for Spain in this period, then at P2 (PI) our estimates for .1.ET2 (.1.ETl ) in 
the relative case provide an upper (lower) bound for the true constructions. 
Therefore, nothing definite can be said in our case about the nature of the 
approximation of our estimates for .1. W T2 and .1. W Tl to their true values. 
However, in any empirical situation one would like to obtain that .1.Jl2 ~ .1.Jlt 
and .1.ET2 ~ .1.ETl, in the hope that the true constructions lie between these 
limits. Of course, an entirely analogous problem must be faced in the absolute 
case. 
Finally, it should be noticed that we have used the information on 
sampling weighting factors provided by INE. Thus, ours are not sample 
estimates but blown up estimates for the total population. 
12 
H. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
H. 1. The role of prices. Previous results on relative inequality 
In Ruiz-Castillo (1995b), we decomposed the change in money 
inequality into two terms: the change in inequality at constant prices, and a 
term capturing the distributional impact of changes in relative prices between 
1973-74 and 1980-81 in a 57 commodity space. Relative inequality was 
measured using several members of the entropy family, including the index 
IT(.) which will be used in the sequel. Original money distributions were 
expressed at prices of the Winter of 1981, denoted by P2' and at an average of 
1973 and 1974 prices, denoted by PI' 
The main finding was that, at both P2 and PI prices, the improvement 
in money inequality was smaller than the improvement in real inequality. 
This result was rather robust to the choice of entropy indices and to the value 
of parameter 0 which reflects the importance given to household size in the 
definition of adjusted household expenditures. The explanation, of course, is 
that changes in relative prices during this period had been less damaging to 
the poor than to the rich. 
This is illustrated in Table 1 for the 8 commodity case. The first 
column shows the commodity price relativities, ordered from the minimum 
to the maximum inflation rate. Columns 2 to 5 present average household 
size and the 8 expenditure shares for the poor, defined as the lower quintile 
in each of the following two household distributions: the distribution of total 
household expenditures (8 = 0), and the distribution of per capita total 
household expenditures (8 = 1). The information is shown for both survey 
years. Columns 6 to 9 present identical information for the rich, defined as 
the upper quintile of the corresponding distributions. 
Table 1 around here 
Given the usual positive (negative) correlation between household 
size and total household expenditure (per capita household expenditure), the 
poor have a low (high) mean household size in the distribution for 0 = 0 (0 = 
I). The opposite is the case for the rich: in both years, when economies of 
scale are assumed to be large (0 = 0), mean household size is large, while 
when we assume no economies of scale (0 = 1), mean household size is 
small. Notice the variation in demographic characteristics experienced by the 
two groups over the period: relatively to 1973-74, at both 8 = 0 and 0 = 1 
Table 1. Commodity inflation rates, and expenditure shares for the poor and the rich in 
both survey years, in percentage temts 
THE POOR THERIOI 
Inflation 1973-74 1980-81 1973-74 1980-81 
* 0=0 0=1 0=0 0=1 0=0 0=1 0=0 0=1 Goods rates 
(1) 276 1,8 3,2 8,5 3,6 8,5 7,0 8,0 6,7 
(2) 280 2,8 2,3 1,9 1,8 2,8 3,0 2,3 2,4 
(3) 286 59,4 60,3 51,5 52,2 32,7 31,3 25,5 25,0 
(4) 295 1,8 2,7 3,0 4,9 13,0 11,9 17,7 16,0 
(5) 312 18,9 15,2 24,8 19,5 14,3 17,2 18,3 21,8 
(6) 333 4,9 5,0 5,0 5,5 10,4 10,5 10,1 9,9 
(7) 349 4,8 4,8 5,2 5,2 9,9 10,8 8,8 9,5 
(8) 367 M 6,5 M Zd M 8,3 M ~ 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Hous. size 2,31 4,20 2,26 4,26 4,79 3,15 4,62 2,97 
----------------------------------------------------
(1) Education, leisure (2) Medical expenditures (3) Food, drinks and tobacco 
(4) Transport and communications (5) Housing (6) Other personal goods and services 
(7) Household goods (8) Clothing and footwear 
* General inflation rate: 306 percent 
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mean household size for the poor increases slightly in 1980-81, while it 
decreases for the rich. 
To undestand the pro-poor bias of relative price changes, measured at 
P2' we have to concentrate on household commodity shares in 1973-74. For 
both values of 8, the share of the last three goods, whose prices increased the 
most, is almost double for the rich than for the poor. For the important good 
5, housing, there is not much of a difference. But the share of food and drinks • 
(good 3), whose price increased less than the general index, is very much 
smaller for the rich. 
Price and income effects lead to the following main changes in 
expenditure shares. For goods 6 to 8, substitution effects seem to dominate for 
the rich, whose share is maintained or slightly decreased; the opposite is the 
case for the poor. Both groups increase their share of housing, and decrease 
their share of food and drinks, although the reduction of the latter is 
relatively greater for the rich. Thus, we expect a smaller pro-poor effect when 
changes in relative prices are evaluated at PI from the point of view of 1980-
81 households. Indeed, in Ruiz-Castillo (1995b) our estimates indicate a 
greater improvement in real inequality at P2 than at PI. 
11.2. Welfare change within the partition by household size 
To isolate the role of prices in inequality and welfare comparisons, 
independently of the complications introduced by demographic 
considerations, we analize first each homogeneous subgroup in the partition 
by household size. The results in the relative case are shown in Table 2. 
Recall that, at P2 for example, for each household size we write 
where 
Moreover, ~ET2 (~ET1) provides an upper (lower) bound for the true relative 
inequality change in real terms, while ~1l2 (~Ill) provides a lower (upper) 
bound for the true real change in the mean. 
Table 2 around here 
TABLE z. Cttftge in real welfare in the partition by household size. The relative case. 
~ographic shares 
Households Persons 
At Pz At PI .. 
Number AW'n~ A" • AE'n AW·TI = A" • AE.·TI or persons 73-74 80-81 73-74 80-81 
I 1.3334 1.1296 1.1804 1.2135 1.0644 1.1402 8.2 7.8 2.2 2.1 
2 1.1683 1.0617 1.1003 1.0901 1.0056 1.0841 20.4 21.1 11.0 11.4 
3 1.0491 1.0232 1.0253 0.9869 0.9657 1.0221 19.5 18.6 15.8 15.1 
4 1.0554 1.0219 1.0329 0.9913 0.9643 1.0279 i 22.2 23.6 23.9 25.6 
5 1.0461 1.0012 1.0449 0.9812 0.9441 I 1.0394 I 14.7 14.9 19.8 20.2 
(; 1.0462 0.9801 1.0675 0.9816 0.9276 1.0583 8.2 7.7 13.3 12.6 
7 1.0437 0.9988 1.0449 0.9795 0.9409 1.0411 3.7 3.6 6.9 6.8 
8 0.9294 0.9172 1.0134 0.8702 0.8646 1.0065 1.7 1.5 3.6 3.3 
9+ ~9081_ ~"-875J3_ ~_.0364_ _O.85~ _0.82~ 1.0390 
------ -- ---
1.4 1.2 3.4 2.9 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
----
/ 
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As in Ruiz-Castillo (1995b), we observe that, for each household size, 
AE12 > AETl; that is, the improvement in real inequality is larger at P2 than at 
PI' This would appear to indicate that the true magnitudes are contained 
between the upper and the lower bounds provided by our estimates. 
However, we find also that, for each household size, AJ..l2 > AJ..lI' This is 
unfortunate, since the true magnitudes appear to be driven apart. A possible 
explanation is that our household specific price indices afe biased 
downwards, so that for all h, yh is too low while yh is too high. This will 
12 21 
make J..l(Y12) too low and J..l(Y21) too high, so that AJ..l2 will be biased upwards 
and AJ..l2 will be biased downwards. In addition, I(y 12) and I(Y21) might be 
biased downwards and upwards, respectively, so that AE12 and AETl are 
brought together, as we have observed before. The end result is that, for each 
household size, welfare at P2 and PI might actually be closer together than 
what our estimates indicate. Nevertheless, in most cases the distance between 
our estimates in the two price regimes is about 6/7 percentage points. 
In any case, it is important to study the heterogeneity we find within 
this basic partition. There are three groups to consider. We begin with 
households consisting of 3- to 7-members which represent, approximately, 
two thirds of all households and 80 percent of all persons. They experience a 
relatively small or no improvement in the mean at constant prices, as well as 
some improvement in relative inequality. As a consequence, their real 
welfare goes up by about 4.5-5 percent at P2' or goes down by about 1.5 percent 
at PI' Next, there are two tails with opposite fortunes. Households of 1 or 2 
persons -28 percent of all households and 13 percent of all persons- combine a 
large improvement in both mean and relative inequality, and therefore a 
large increase in real welfare. The remaining 3 percent of all households but 
7.5 of all persons, consisting of 8 or more persons, experience losses in the 
mean, little or no change in real inequality and considerable losses in real 
welfare, of about 7 to 13 percent depending on whether we look at P2 or PI' 
respectively. 
The results for the absolute case are in Table 3. Recall that, for every 
value of the inequality aversion parameter y, and for every household size, 
the joint impact on welfare of changes in absolute inequality and changes in 
the mean are evaluated relative to welfare at situation 1. Table 3 contains 
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estimates of absolute inequality and welfare change for y values equal t07 5.10-
7,5.10-6, and 10-5. 
Table 3 around here 
To interpret the results, we must take into account that, mantaining 
relative inequality constant, any change in the mean causes absolute 
inequality to vary in the same direction. Thus, large increases (decreases) in 
the mean for small (large) households pushes down (up) changes in absolute 
inequality. On the other hand, maintaining the mean constant, a c~nge in 
relative inequality causes a change in the same direction in absolute 
inequality. Given the general improvement in relative inequality, except for 
1 and 3 person households for which the mean grows substantially, all groups 
experiment an improvement in absolute inequality. Finally, as in the relative 
case, we have a 3 group breakdown at the welfare level: at P2' for example, we 
observe considerable increases for 1 and 2 person households, smaller ones 
for the majority of the population consisting of 3 to 7 members, and a welfare 
loss for very large households. 
11. 3. The population as a whole in the single parameter model 
We have seen that, during this period, there are considerable 
differences in the social evaluation of households of different sizes. How do 
these differences get aggregated at the population level? Our view depends 
necessarily on the way household size is taken into account in the definition 
of adjusted household expenditure. Recall that, in the relative case, adjusted 
expenditure for household h is defined by 
Therefore, 
so that the mean is a decreasing function of e. On the other hand, in Spain, 
like in the U.K., we found in Ruiz-Castillo (1995b) that relative inequality 
follows a U pattern. As we see in Table 4 in the Appendix, relative welfare 
turns out to be decreasing with e at both PI and P2 in both surveys. 
The information about changes in real welfare, in terms of changes in 
the mean and changes in inequality, is in the upper part of Table 5 in the 
TABLE 3. Change in the mean, absolute inequality and real welfare in the partition 
by household size. In percentages relative to W"(YIOIZI), m= 1,2, ... ,9+, Po 
= III and Po = PI' 
At p, At PI 
Num. of 4W.,.2= 41' + AE.,2 4W.,.I= 41' + AE'.,.1 persons 
"y = 5 • 10.7 
- -
1 15.3 14.2 -1.2 7.2 6.6 0.6 
2 S-.6 6.8 1.9 1.4 0.6 0.8 
3 3.2 2.5 0.7 -3.0 -3.5 0.5 
4 3.5 2.4 1.1 -3.0 -3.6 0.6 
5 2.2 0.1 2.1 -4.8 -5.8 1.0 
6 0.9 -2.2 3.1 -5.9 -7.5 1.6 
7 2.2 -0.1 2.3 -5.0 -6.1 1.1 
8 -6.8 -9.4 2.6 -12.9 -14.1 1.2 
9+ -9.2 -14.6 5.4 -19.1 -21.1 2.0 
"y = 5 • 10" 
1 19.8 20.1 -0.3 10.6 7.8 2.8 
2 13.2 9.8 3.4 4.9 0.7 4.3 
3 3.6 3.5 0.1 -1.5 -4.1 2.6 
4 6.9 3.4 3.6 -0.8 -4.2 3.4 
5 5.6 0.2 5.4 -1.5 -6.9 5.4 
6 7.4 -3.3 10.8 -2.1 -9.0 6.9 
7 5.1 -0.2 5.3 -1.3 -7.6 6.2 
8 -6.7 -14.9 8.1 -10.7 -17.8 7.1 
9+ -5~7 -24.2 18.4 -13.6 -27.7 14..0. 
"y = 1 • 10.5 
1 20.2 24.1 -3.9 12.0 8:7 3.3 
2 14.3 12.1 2.2 6.6 0.8 5.8 
3 2.3 4.4 -2.1 -1.0 -4.5 3.5 
4 8.6 4.2 4.4 0.5 -4.8 5.3 
5 5.1 0.2 4.9 -0.1 -7.8 7.7 
6 8.4 -4.3 12.7 0.4 -10.3 10.7 
7 2.3 -0.3 2.6 O. I -8.7 8.8 
8 -11.3 -19.2 -10.3 -20.7 10.4 
r 
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Appendix, while the patterns in percentage terms, as a function of 0, are 
shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 1. The main conclusions are the 
following: i) at P2' there has been an improvement in real mean, real 
inequality and, hence, real welfare; ii) however, at Pt decreases in real 
inequality barely offset losses in real mean; iii) in both cases the change in real 
welfare is remarkably stable as a function of 0. 
Figure 1 around here 
In the absolute case, adjusted household expenditure is defined as 
.., 
where the parameter A can be interpreted as the cost of an adult. We have 
selected parameter values for 'k and "I so as to achieve a wide range of 
variation of the ratio of absolute inequality to the distribution mean. At P2' 
the upper bound for A has been fixed at 90.000 pesetas, which is 35 percent of 
the mean of per capita household expenditures in 1980-81, or close to per 
capita household expenditure for very large units consisting of more than 10 
members. Given the selection of yts already mentioned, values of A beyond 
90.000 lead to negative welfare estimates which are difficult to interpret. At 
Pt, household adjusted expenditures are smaller than at P2 by a factor greater 
than 3. Correspondingly, in this case we have fixed the upper bound for A at 
30.000 pesetas. 
The estimates for the unweighted distributions in both survey years 
are available upon request. The main result is that absolute inequality 
decreases with A most of the time. However, as can be seen in the upper left 
hand panel of Figure 2, for high values of "I at P2 absolute inequality for both 
survey years first decreases and then increases as A approaches its upper 
bound. Such curvature is less pronounced at Pt. On the other hand, we 
observe in the right hand panel of Figure 2 that at both P2 and Pt there is an 
improvement in absolute inequality for all values of y. Such an 
improvement is greater the smaller the aversion to inequality, and in all 
cases varies little as a function of A. 
Figure 2 around here 
For the intermediate value "I = 5.10-6, numerical estimates of welfare 
change in terms of changes in the mean and changes in absolute inequality, 
relative to welfare at situation I, are presented in Table 6 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 3 provides a graphical representation for all y. The main conclusions 
are that: i) at every value of A, the improvement in real welfare tends to be 
smaller the greater the aversion to absolute inequality. ii) For every value of 
y, the change in real welfare increases slightly as a function of A, exploding at 
high values of yand A as a consequence of large increases in inequality, partly 
induced by large increases in the mean8. iii) As in the relative case, the results 
vary considerably depending on whether real change is expressed at P2 or PI. 
Figure 3 around here 
11.4. The distinction between children and adults in the two parameter 
model and the DEeD scale 
Next we consider the case in which adults and children receive 
different treatment. In particular, we study the convenient parametrization in 
which "effective household size" is seen to be equal to 
h h 
sA + 11 se' 11E (0,1] 
where s~ and s~ are the number of adults and children in household h, and 11 
is a parameter. Then, in the relative case we will have 
h h h h 8 
Yto(8,11) = \/((sA + 11 se) . 
We compare previous results, in which 11 = I, with the following 
values for 11: 0.75, 0.50, and 0.25. Estimates of the full grid for the two 
parameter model (8, 11) in the unweighted case at P2' are available upon 
request. Here, by way of example, we concentrate in the the 1973-74 
distribution at prices of situation 2. In the upper part of Figure 4 we show how 
the estimate of ET(Y12(8,l1» = 1 - IT(Y12(8,l1» varies with 8 and 11 for the 
unweighted distribution. 
Figure 4 around here 
As predicted in Jenkins and Cowell (1994), i) when 8 is low (:5 0.4), 
variations in 11 have a negligible impact on equality: as a function of 11 the 
corresponding curves are very flat (upper left hand side of Figure 4), while as 
a function of 8 they are very close together (upper right hand side of that. 
Figure). Also ii) the inverse-U pattern implied by 8 variations are less 
pronounced when 11 is relatively low. At any rate, for each household size, 
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lowering" raises the equivalent expenditures of larger households relative to 
those of smaller households; given the negative covariance between number 
of children and total household expenditure, there is an equalising impact. 
The gross grid we have investigated does not allow us to see whether there is 
a non-mono tonic relationship of the type detected by J enkins and Cowell 
(1994) at low values of" . 
Since we find sufficient stability in shape for other distributions, we 
end here the report for single cross-sections. Furthemore, we are mostly 
interested in trends. The lower part of Figure 4 shows the change in relative 
inequality and welfare at P2' We observe that the improvement in real 
inequality is uniformly smaller as the weight given to children decreases. The 
impact on the mean (not shown) goes in the opposite direction. The net result 
is that, at every value of 0, the improvement in real welfare increases as 11 
decreases. However, the magnitude of the impact is very small indeed. 
To complete this study of the sensitivity of our results to different 
models for taking into account demographic factors, we have considered the 
so-called GECD equivalence scale, widely used internationally, including the 
Spanish INE. It gives a unit weight to the first adult -a person 14 or more years 
old- 0.7 to each additional adult, and 0.5 to every person less than 14 years old. 
In other words, efficient household size is now equal to 
h h 1 + 0.7 (SA - 1) + 0.5 (se)' 
Estimates in Tables 4 to 6 in the Appendix and graphical representations in 
Figure 4 for the realtive case are referred to by the symbol GECD. 
We see that, for the individual cross-sections, the GECD estimate 
corresponds to a low value of 0 -and hence any value of 11- or a high value of 
both 0 and ". For the change in real welfare in the unweighted case at P2' the 
GECD estimate corresponds to the choice (0,11) = (0.8, 0.25); that is, counting 
children at half what the GECD suggests, but admitting small economies of 
scale in consumption. This result is robust to changes in the reference price 
vector and in the weighting scheme. 
11. 5. The unit of analysis: households versus persons 
Given the pattern within the partition by household size, where 
smaller households experience a greater welfare improvement than larger 
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ones, we must have smaller overall improvements when comparing the 
personal distributions. The graphical information on weighted distributions 
in the relative and the absolute case is in Figures 1 and 3 (see Tables 5 and 6 
in the Appendix, respectively). In the absolute case, for instance, at P2 welfare 
increases vary from 6.5 to 9.3 percent as a function of y -versus 8.6 to 12.8 
percent in the unweighted case- while at Pl' welfare losses go from 1.4 to 2.9 
percent -versus a variation in the interval (+0.3, -0.3) in the unweighted case. 
11.6. Using a single price index for all households 
That intertemporal comparisons of welfare require an adjustment for 
price change is, of course, widely recognized. However, researchers often 
correct the original distributions with a single measure of price change for all 
households9. As a final exercise, we have done that for the population as a 
whole taking into account the 322 percent inflation rate during this period, 
measured by the official consumer price index. Notice that now, in the 
relative case 
and 
Both expressions give the ratios in money terms. Estimates appear under the 
* p heading in Tables 5 and 6 in the Appendix, as well as in Figure l. 
We see that, in both the unweighted and the weighted cases, the 
* change in real welfare at p as a function of e is not that different from the 
* change estimated at P2. However, as far as the reasons for it, estimates at p 
tell the wrong story: a large improvement in the mean and a relatively small 
improvement in money inequality. Because the change from Pl to P2 has 
damaged the standard of living of the rich more than that of the poor, what 
has happened in Spain during this period is exactly the opposite: a relatively 
small increase in the mean, but a considerable improvement in real 
inequality. 
* The absolute case is illustrated in Figure 3, also under the p heading 
(for the numerical information, see Table 6 in the Appendix). At an 
intermediate value of y, for instance, the picture is very similar: i) welfare 
* change at p is of the same order of magnitude than at P2. ii) However, the 
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mean effect is exagerated at the expense of the improvement in inequality. As 
a matter of fact, at high /.. values and high mean increments we observe a 
nonexistent loss in absolute inequality. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have investigated the evolution of the standard of living 
in Spain from 1973-74 to 1980-81 for a population of about 10 million household 
and 34 or 37 million persons occupying residential housing. The standard of 
living has been approximated by a measure of private consumption: total 
household expenditures, net of certain investment items. Comparisons in real 
terms have been made possible by household specific statistical consumer price 
indices, constructed on a 57-dimensional commodity space. The heterogeneity of 
the household population has been taken into account by means of several 
parametrizations of the weight to be given to household size, or to a child's 
needs relative to those of an adult. 
Social evaluations have been performed by scalar indicators which 
permit to summarise judgements about an entire distribution by means of two 
statistics: the mean and an index of either relative or absolute inequality. 
Standard restrictions, as well as the requirement of additive separability, lead to 
a member of the general entropy family of SEFs in the relative case, and to 
several members of the Kolm-Pollak family in the absolute case. Comparisons 
have been made with and without weighting household adjusted expenditure by 
household size in the domain of the SEF. 
The main empirical conclusions are the following: 
1. According to our budget surveys, mean household expenditure 
increased about 2 percent at prices of situation 2 (Winter 1981), or decreased at 
least 3.5 percent at prices of situation 1 (an average of 1973 and 1974 prices). This 
fundamental change has not been distributed uniformly across subgroups. 
Households of 1 or 2 persons enjoy a considerable increase in the mean even at 
Pl; a majority of the population consisting of households from 3 to 7 persons 
experience a slight increase at P2 or a slight decrease at Pl; the remaining of the 
population, consisting of large households, experience large losses. 
2. Relative inequality has improved for all subgroups at both price 
regimes, but the ordering by household size according to the magnitude of such 
improvement is the same as before. Hence, at P2 small households end up with 
welfare increases greater than 15 percent, 3 to 7 person households with 
increases about 4-5 percent, and large households with welfare losses close to 10 
percent. At Pl' only small households have some welfare gains. 
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Because the measurement of absolute inequality depends on the 
measurement unit, large increases (decreases) in the mean for small (large) 
households pushes down (up) changes in absolute inequality. Nevertheless, 
except for 1 or 3 person households, all subgroups have an improvement in 
absolute inequality. Consequently, welfare changes follow the same pattern as in 
the relative case at both P2 and PI. 
3. Pooling these subgroups into a single population requires value 
judgements to make welfare comparisons across subgroups. When we control 
the ethical weight to be given to household size by parameters <:> and A. in the 
relative and the absolute case, respectively, we find that although cross section 
estimates are affected in a non linear manner, aggregate welfare trends do not 
depend much on such parametrisations. However, in the absolute case, welfare 
change increases slightly with A.. This, together with the variation induced by 
changes in the aversion to inequality parameter, opens up the results range of 
variation. 
4. When we recognize that children might very well be given smaller 
weights than adults, we find that counting a child at 75, 50, or 25 percent of an 
adult has an equalising effect at the cross section level but a small impact on 
welfare comparisons. 
5. In the relative case, the central conclusion is that at prices P2 there has 
been a mean improvement at least as large as 2 percent, an improvement in 
relative inequality at most equal to 5.5 percent, and an improvement in real 
welfare of about 8 percent At prices PI' there has been a loss in real mean at 
least as large as 3.5 percent, an improvement in inequality at least as large as 5 
percent, and a negligible improvement in real welfare at most equal to 1.5 
percent 
In the absolute case, inequality improvements are larger the smaller the 
aversion to inequality parameter y. At P2 there has been an increase in real 
welfare of about 3.5-10.0 percent, depending on the choice of A. and y. Between 
2.0-6.5 percent of such an increase should be attributed to an improvement in 
absolute inequality, and the rest to a slight improvement in the mean. At PI' the 
estimates for the change in real welfare vary from a decrease of about 3.5 percent 
to an improvement of 2 percent, depending on A. and y. This is the result of a 
relatively large loss in the mean in the range 4.5-8.0 percent, partially offset by 
an improvement in absolute inequality of 1.0-9.0 percent 
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6. If one applies the same inflation rate to all households in situation 1, 
estimates of welfare change are similar to those registered at P2 with household 
specific price indices. However, most of the change is attributed to an increase in 
the mean. This missperception is to be expected in a period in which relative 
prices have evolved so as to cause a larger reduction in the standard of living of 
the rich, relative to the poor, hereby improving real inequality beyond the 
improvement in money inequality. 
7. Given the fact that larger households do worse than smaller ones, 
welfare changes suffer a downward shift when in the domain of the social 
evaluation functions each household's adjusted expenditure is weighted by 
household size. This is the case at both Pl and P2 in the relative and the absolute 
approach. 
8. From a quantitative point of view, choosing Pl or P2 to express 
aggregate welfare change in real terms causes a larger impact than counting or 
not children differently from adults, giving a large or no weight to household. 
size, weighting or not household expenditure by household size in the domain of 
the social evaluation function, or even choosing a relative or an absolute notion 
of inequality. However, there is some evidence of a possible downward bias in 
our estimate of household specific price indices. If this is the case, our estimates 
of welfare change at both price regimes should be closer, thereby reducing the 
role of the base year choice. 
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NOTES 
1. Recent reports based on questionnaires indicate that people are by no 
means unanimous in their choice between relative, absolute or other 
intermediate notions of inequality. See, for instance, Amiel and Cowell (1992), 
and Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo (1994). 
2. The assumption was first introduced in the theoretical literature by 
Lewbel (1989) and Blackorby and Donaldson (1993, 1994). Among many 
econometric applications see, for instance, Jorgenson and Slesnick (1987). 
3. Of course, additive separability is essencial for the study of any other 
partition. For an application to partitions by geographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics, which will not be treated here, see Ruiz-Castillo (1995c). 
4. This is in agreement with results in Sanz (1995) showing a loss close to 
40 percent when income information in the EPF's is compared with National 
Accounts data. 
5. See Ayala et al (1993). 
6. See Ruiz-Castillo (1987). 
7. In the only previous empirical study we know with complete 
indicators of absolute inequality from this family, Blackorby et al (1981) choose 
values of y equal to 5.10-6, 5.10-5, 10-4, and 5.10-4 for distributions expressed in 
Canadian dollars. 
8. For y = 10-5 and A. = 90.000, welfare at Y12 is barely positive. Welfare 
change at P2 and that A. value causes a large discontinuity which, to avoid 
distortions, has not been represented in Figure 3. 
9. See, for instance, Jenkins (1991). 
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APPENDIX n 
TABLE 4. Mean, relative equality, and welfare in both survey years. Unweiihted 
distributions. . 
0.0 0.2 
1973·74 at PI : YI 
" 
254,608 195,073 
Er 0.7684 0.7897 
WT 195,635 ·154,040 
1980·81 at PI : Y2t 
" 
243,627 187,561 
Er 0.8143 0.8327 
"'T 198,378 156,187 
1973·74 at P: : Yu 
" 
842,677 645,743 
Er 0.7543 0.7750 
WT 635,614 500,448 
1980·81 at P: : Y2 
" 
854,091 657,611 
Er 0.8050 0.8231 
"'T 687,504 541,303 
1973·74 at p. : )'1° 
" 
819,640 627,983 
Er 0.7684 0.7897 
"'T 629,792 495,889 
0.4 
150,843 
. 
0.8029 
121,110 
145,707 
0.8434 
122,889 
499,413 
0.7876 
393,341 
510,921 
0.8335 
425,861 
485,597 
0.8029 
389,880 
e 
0.6 
117,787 
0.8071 
95,061 
114,285 
0.8452 
96.595 
390,034 
0.7911 
308,550 
400,782 
0.8350 
334,658 
379,182 
0.8071 
306,022 
0.8 1.0 
92,933 74,131 
0.8010 0.7837 
74,443 58,095 
90,558 72,535 
0.8370 0.8177 
75,799 59,310 
307,783 245,552 
0.7843 0.7661 
241,395 188,116 
317,608 254,429 
0.8265 0.8067 
262,494 265,249 
299,172 238,644 
0.8010 0.7837 
239,649 187,021 
OECD 
96,054 
0.8040 
77,227 
94,114 
0.8374 
78,811 
318,015 
0.7876 
250,477 
330,010 
0.8271 
272,947 
309,219 
0.8040 
248,611 
00 
N 
TABLE 5. Change in real welfare in terms of changes in the mean and relative equality, in ratio form. 
UNWEIGHTED DlSTRIBtmONS 
At Pt At Pz 
0 AWn = All :. • AEn AWn = 4.,&2 • AEn AW,... = 
0.0 1.0140 0.9569 1.0597 1.0817 1.0135 1.0672 1.0917 
0.1 1.0138 0.9615 1.0545 1.0816 1.0184 1.0621 1.0915 
0.4 1.01.47 0.9660 1.0505 1.0827 1.0230 1.0583 1.0923 
0.6 1.0161 0.9703 1.0472 1.0846 1.0276 1.0555 1.0935 
O~. 1.0182 0.9744 1.0449 1.0874 1.0319 1.0538 1.0954 
1.0 1.0209 0.9785 1.0434 1.0911 1.0362 1.0530 1.0974 
OECD 1.020S 0.9798 1.0415 1.0897 1.0377 1.0502 1.0979 
WEIGHTED BY SIZE 
0.0 0.9870 0.9375 1.0528 1.0518 0.9932 1.0590 1.0629 
0.2 0.9880 0.9433 1.0474 1.0529 0.9993 1.0535 1.0641 
0.4 0.9898 0.9488 1.0432 1.0548 1.0051 1.0494 1.0660 
0.6 0.9921 0.9540 1.0400 1.0574 1.0107 1.0462 1.0683 
0 •• 0.9949 0.9591 1.0373 1.0607 1.0160 1.0440 1.0711 
1.0 0.9981 0.9639 1.0354 1.0645 1.0210 1.0426 1.0741 
OECD 0.9971 0.9658 1.0324 1.0629 1.0232 1.0388 1.0735 
Atp· 
4Il. • 4E,.. 
I 
1.0420 1.0476 
1.0472 1.0423 
1.0522 1.0382 
1.0570 1.0346 
1.0616 1.0318 
1.0661 1.0293 
1.0672 1.0287 
1.0203 1.0418 
1.0267 1.0364 I 
1.0329 1.0320 
1.0387 1.0285 
1.0443 1.0256 
1.0497 1.0233 
1.0514 1.0211 
29 
TABLE 6. Change in real welfare in terms of a change in the mean and a change in 
absolute inequality at 'Y ... 5 . 10", in percentages. 
~'WEIGHTED DISTRIBUTIONS 
At Pa 
). 
° 
15,000 30,000 45,000 60,000' 75,000 
4/1o,~ 2.46 2.69 2.95 3.29 3.72 4.33 
4E'2~ 6.18 6.26 6.38 6.56 6.80 7.14 
4W.2· 8.65 8.95 9.34 9.84 10.52 11.46 
). 
° 
5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 
4/10.' -5.52 -5.77 -6.07 -6.43 -6.86 -7.39 
4E'1 5.89 6.06 6.26 6.51 6.83 7.23 
4W,I: 0.37 0.28 0.18 0.08 -0.04 -0.17 
At p. 
). 0 15,000 30,000 45,000 60,000 75,000 
4/10. 7.42 7.90 8.49 9.25 10.26 11.68 
4E,.' 0.98 0.78 0.55 0.25 -0.14 -0.72 
4"',.' 8.40 8.68 9.04 9.50 10.12 10.96 
WEIGHTED DISTRIBUTIONS BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE 
At P2 . 
). 
° 
15,000 30,000 45,000 60,000 
4p.,: . 
-0.89 -0.79 -0.69 -0.57 -0.43 
4E,; 7.36 . 7.59 7.90 8.30 8.84 
4W,,' 6.47 6.80 7.21 7.74 8.41 
). 
° 
5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 
4/10. -7.73 -8.17 -8.69 -9.32 -10.11 
4E,,' 6.33 6.61 6.96 7.39 7.93 
4W,,' -1.40 -1.55 . -1.73 -1.93 -2.18 
90,000 OECD 
5.24 4.88 
7.60 2.07 
12.83 6.95 
30,000 OECD 
-8.06 -2.22 
7.75 2.01 
-0.31 -0.22 
90,000 OECD 
13.85 8.52 
-1.67 -0.79 
12.18 7.73 
75,000 90,000 
-0:24 0.01 
9.58 10.70 
9.34 10.71 
25,000 30,000 
-11.11 -12.42 
8.63 9.54 
-2.48 -2.87 
